Beyond the metaphor of corporate citizenship
Although we normally treat business organizations as independent legal entities carrying out activities in pursuit of particular goals, they only exist thanks to the objectives and the resources of their human incorporators. Corporations are collective instruments created by individual citizens to achieve ends which they, otherwise, would be unable to reach as effectively. Those ends are most likely to have a sociopolitical dimension and reflect the values of the community to which the individuals, as primary citizens, belong. Business theory has borrowed the notion of citizenship from politics mainly to highlight the social dimension of business organizations. Citizenship lends firms a sense of identity, membership in the community and a justification for their rights and responsibilities as artificial, legal persons or ''secondary citizens '' (Wood et al., 2006, pp. 35-36) .
The concept of citizenship, however, has a long history. In the Politics, Aristotle (1990) delves into the question of citizenship upon observing that the ''state is composite, [and] like any other whole [is] made up of many parts -these are the citizens'' (Pltcs 1274b). He then proceeds to identify who the citizen is and the meaning of the term, by determining what the citizen does. Next, Aristotle differentiates citizens from other people residing in the state. Finally, he distinguishes the various kinds of citizens depending on the form of government or regimes.
For Aristotle, ''a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken'' is he who ''shares in the administration of justice, and in offices'' (Pltcs 1275a). The essential task of the citizen is to participate in deciding what is good and just in the state and in putting this into effect. He specifies that a citizen is a ''juryman and member of the assembly'', to whom ''is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things'' (Pltcs 1275b). Although many people participate in deliberating and deciding on the public good, only citizens have the right to do so. What characterizes a citizen is ''the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state'' (Pltcs 1275b). This does not mean that a citizen has to hold office. It is enough that he be eligible, for citizenship requires ''sharing in governing and being governed'' (Pltcs 1283b). One does not lose citizenship when governed or out of office, as long as he can govern or hold office some other time.
Aristotle was aware that the state needed other kinds of people aside from citizens (Pltcs 1278a). Hence, necessity for the state's survival does not automatically qualify one for citizenship. Children who still cannot exercise sufficient deliberation and judgment may only be called citizens with certain limitations. Neither are artisans citizens, for the artisan class was composed mostly by slaves and foreigners: ''The necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are servants of the community'' (Pltcs 1278a). Citizens do not refer to free men as such -otherwise, foreign workers would be citizens -but to those freed from menial services. Citizenship requires freedom from worrying about daily needs, as participating in the discussion about the public good demands leisure. Because of this, citizenship implies relative affluence, material wealth, and comfort.
Having so defined citizenship, Aristotle clarifies that there are as many kinds as forms of government, such that ''he who is a citizen in democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy'' (Pltcs 1275a). He indicates that his definition is best suited to a democracy. It does not apply to states where people do not have rights, hold regular assemblies or decide on law-suits (Pltcs 1275b). Neither does it apply to aristocracies, where citizenship is based on excellence and merit, nor in oligarchies, where it is based on wealth (Pltcs 1278a).
In summary, ''citizen'' preeminently applies to an adult, able-bodied male, himself the son of citizenparents, who enjoys sufficient economic means to actively engage in the governance of his home citystate, by voting or being voted into office. Although a state may require other classes of people to be viable, citizens form the most important group. The definition of a citizen may vary according to the regime and Aristotle's description best fits citizens in a democracy.
In more recent times, the discussion of citizenship has revolved around two distinct models. Liberalminimalist citizenship stresses the ''negative freedoms'' -such as freedom from oppression or arbitrary rule, especially by the state -and its discourse is based on the language of rights (Crane et al., 2003, pp. 7-9) . The primary duty of the state or government is to secure these rights. Civic republican or communitarian citizenship, on the other hand, focuses on active participation in the common good by fostering community ties and promoting civic virtues (Crane et al., 2003, pp. 7-9; Wood et al. 2006, pp. 42-43) . The emphasis lies in the fulfillment of duties and obligations towards the group. Government and the state are expected, above all, to act in a subsidiary manner and strengthen already existing institutions such as families, schools, churches, and so forth. Aristotelian doctrine undoubtedly comes closer to civic republican or communitarian citizenship than to the liberal-minimalist model.
As of late, both civic republican and communitarian theorists have distanced themselves from an either/or perspective between liberalism and the respective positions they hold (Laborde and Maynor, 2008, pp. 1-2) . Pettit (1997, p. vii) , for instance, advocates a republican ideal of political liberty that is inherently social in character while providing the individual with a sense of psychological security and status. He calls this ideal ''freedom as non-domination'' and distinguishes it equally from the more traditional negative or ''non-interference'' and positive or ''self-mastery'' concepts of freedom. ''Freedom as non-domination'' surpasses these more traditional concepts to the extent that it minimizes uncertainty, strategic deference to the powerful and social subordination (Pettit, 1997, pp. 273-274) . Similarly, Dagger (1997, pp. 3-6) proposes a conciliatory view, on the one hand, of individual rights and civic duties, and on the other, of political deliberation and a sense of community. Through a basic right to autonomy, founded on the moral equality among individuals, Dagger endeavors to show how civic virtues can be cultivated by means of the recognition of interdependence, reciprocity and fair play.
It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to delve into the nuances of the liberal-republican continuum that these authors conceive, because its purpose is primarily to develop Aristotelian sources. Furthermore, certain ideas expressed in Dagger (1997, pp. 5-6) such as the confusion between the ''embeddedness in social relations'' and ''social constitution'' of human beings or the equivalence between the ''general will'' in Rousseau and the ''common good'' in Aristotle seem to warrant this stance. Something akin may be said of Pettit (1997, pp. 273, 275) , with his borrowing of the notions of ''primary goods'' and ''reflective equilibrium'' from Rawls, for example, since these are extremely difficult to square with the original Aristotelian position. As for the ''communitarian'' label, my intention is to use it in a broad sense, such as the equally social or
